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 
Abstract— This paper tries to find the determinants and the 
economic performance measurements in the telecom sector by 
studying the impact of policy reform and the macro-institutional 
environment along with external factors such as the investment effort, 
population size and sector revenues in the MENA region on the 
economic performance in the sector. 
The privatization in the MENA region corresponded in many cases to 
a foreign capital participation which makes the analysis of the effect 
of this interaction very important. 
In a dynamic Panel data model, the System GMM estimator of 
Blundel and Bond (1998) allows us estimating the coefficients of 
each determinant as well as the weight of the reform policy and the 
institutional environment on the economic performance of the sector 
 
Keywords— privatization, policy of openness, institutional 
quality, economic performance. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the last two decades, there has been a global reform 
wave that significantly affected both the market structure and 
institutions infrastructure industries, including sectors such as 
telecommunications, electricity and more traditional areas such 
as water and postal services. 
 
Moreover, the political task is to redesign the basic legal and 
regulatory framework to generate economic incentives in these 
sectors. 
 
And more particularly, it is encouraging operators to improve 
their offers in terms of cost-effectiveness, quality of service 
and pricing. 
Since the 90s, policy makers in developing countries have 
further the process of reforms of their infrastructure sectors. 
After a period of implementation of policies of liberalization 
and privatization of some segments 
accompanied by the creation of regulatory authorities, major 
efforts have been allocated to improve the efficiency of the 
functioning of these authorities. 
 
The degree of independence, the ability of human capital, and 
in particular the quality governance in the sector are the three 
elements of policy have mobilized a large part of these efforts. 
The economic theory advocated by L variables. Boltanksi and 
L.Thévenot (1987), argue quantities derived from a social 
rather than industrial. In this framework, a complementary  
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approach emphasizes the interest of the discussion around a 
framework for integrated analysis that takes into account the 
quality of sectoral regulatory bodies at the same time as that of 
the overall environment in which these bodies operate (Gasmi 
et al., 2006). 
 
To demonstrate the vital role that institutions play in the 
development and growth (Edison, 2003), many studies based 
on this new paradigm were conducted, highlighting the 
influence of institutional environments on the effectiveness 
sector reforms. A large part of these studies for infrastructure 
sectors, particularly telecommunications and energy, 
traditionally structured vertically integrated monopolies. 
In a structuralist approach to industrial economy (Masson 
1939), performance is supposed to express the set of a set of 
variables relating to industry structures and behaviors of its 
businesses. Indeed, assessing the nature of competition laws 
has led economists to explain industrial linkages between 
market structures and various performance related thereto. The 
characteristic of this approach is the minimization of the role 
of behavior "C" in the sequence "PCS". Thus, this approach 
suggests a model highlighting the market structure and 
performance associated with it. 
Studies of policies in this area recognize that the results of the 
liberalization of trade in services largely depend on the 
regulatory environment. 
For New Institutional School (NIE), the type of property has 
significant effects on the behavior of the firm and 
performance. Certainly, a change in the allocation of property 
causes a different structure for encouraging management thus 
inducing a change in managerial behavior and performance of 
the company. 
This paper has two objectives. First, the introduction of a new 
dataset for MENA countries on Telecommunications Policy. 
Secondly, the analysis of the impact of telecommunications 
policy on the performance of the telecommunications sector. 
Firstly, we are called to answer the following questions: first, 
what impact changes in specific policies - relating to 
ownership, competition and regulation - have on sectoral 
performance? Second, the order in which reforms are 
implemented there an impact on performance? 
Results found (Gasmi et al. (2006)) show a positive effect of 
policy reforms on the performance of the sector. However, it is 
unclear to what extent these results can be applied to 
developing countries, most of them have introduced reforms 
with less developed networks in the world. 
 
This concern can be clarified using the database of the World 
Bank / ITU telecommunications policy. 
Moreover, in the context of this work through a panel model 
with dynamic effect, we evaluate the impact of alternative 
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reform policies and regulations in 15 economies of the MENA 
Zone for the period 1990-2009. 
For each country and for each year, we identify the 
information about the status of the incumbent (government, 
corporation and / or private company), on the state of 
competition in different market segments (local and mobile 
services), and the presence of a regulatory body separate from 
the incumbent. 
 
After taking into account the effects of exogenous wealth, 
technological effort and the size of the population, we will 
analyze how changes in policy affect different measures of 
performance of telecommunications services, and what is the 
measure most appropriate economic performance. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. The second section 
describes the determinants of the performance of the 
telecommunications sector citing two components: the 
component and the institutional reform. Section three presents 
a conceptual framework to analyze the extent of the 
Performance of telecommunication services for the MENA 
area. 
 
II- Determinants of Telecommunications Performance: 
Theoretical and Empirical: 
 
The theoretical and empirical studies do not draw clear 
conclusions, about the determinants and measurement of 
economic performance and especially sectoral performance. 
The definition of performance is multiple. Obeying a key 
economic component, which reflects the efficiency 
performance in terms of cost and efficiency that translate in 
terms of objectives. This definition is related to three 
economic approaches namely the neoclassical theory of the 
firm, evolutionary theory and organizational theory (Liliane 
Bensahel 1997). 
 
In their work, Henry John Gathon, Pierre Pestieau (1996) 
classified the missions and objectives of economics into three 
categories: efficiency, equity and macroeconomic stability. 
However, macroeconomic and distributional objectives took 
back by supplying the requirements of efficiency and 
profitability, which justified the mode of privatization. 
These authors subdivided efficiency in two dimensions; 
technical efficiency explained by the ability of a firm to 
produce goods or services with the least possible resources and 
allocative efficiency explained by a better use of resources to 
produce goods and services providing welfare highest in the 
community. 
In the traditional model of performance (Tertre 2009), the first 
register being quality is defined on the basis of a 
standardization process based on standards that the company 
designs and controlled from its scientific and technical 
knowledge. 
 
  The second register ie productivity or rather the productivity 
gains from three determinants (Tertre 2009) combining their 
effects. The first determinant is the economies of scale, for 
which the unit cost of products decreases with increasing the 
volume of production. 
 
The second is the intensity of direct labor, certainly, the 
division of labor made from simple tasks, repetitive and 
controllable can initiate learning logic thereby reducing unit 
production times. 
 
The last determinant is the "integration hardware" Indeed, 
technological innovation promotes the integration of 
previously separate different sequences productive. 
The third register is manifested in the return on capital, the 
profitability is ensured by two dynamics: the productivity gains 
which leads to lower unit costs, then lower relative prices, thus 
increasing effective demand and the volume of production and 
the steady evolution of quality started by merely technical 
progress to ensure a lower relative prices less than the lower 
unit costs (Tertre 2009). 
 
In addition, the service sector is a difficult area to analyze and 
study. Certainly, for an analysis of the effect of liberalization, 
which is a crucial milestone in the sector's performance, 
ownership of competition policy, regulatory reforms are 
crucial in the study of liberalization "immaterial". 
 
III-Econometric Investigation 
A-Variables and data entry 
 
Economic performance of the sector is the dependent variable, 
it is entered through five indicators of levels of service offer, 
prices and productivity in the sector. 
 
For each performance measure (Model productivity, price and 
quality), we defined the following reduced form model, 
expressing for each country i, sector s and period t the 
dependent variable Yist based on the following: 
 
a) a country-specific effects, ƒi ; b) a set of exogenous 
economic characteristics expected to affect performance 
regardless of the regulatory and market structure, Zs [i, t] c) a 
group of indicators for market reform, Ms [i, t] d) xit is the 
vector of regressors representing, among others, the quality of 
the macro-institutional. 
yist = c + αis ƒi + Z’s βs + M’s γs  + x′it β + εist    (1) 
 
It assesses the impact of regulation and market structure, 
institutional quality and exogenous factors on productivity, the 
price of mobile services and fixed and the quality of service, 
from equation (1 ). 
 
Be determined in the first place, the greatest weight that 
influences the performance of its three dimensions, is that 
institutional quality and policy reform? And the single most 
decisive.  
In the second place, the performance measure most significant 
and most suitable for our study sample? 
  
 
In the third place, the order in which reforms are implemented 
on performance. 
 
 
The exogenous characteristics are supposed to reflect national 
specificities in terms of economic structure (income levels, 
population size, input costs and pricing structures) and 
technology (capital intensity and quality), in addition to 
specific effects country. In addition, the indicators of 
regulation and market structure does not just its shadow. These 
variables introduced in order to understand the evolution of 
regulatory frameworks over time and across countries in the 
region, thus increasing the accuracy and reliability of the 
estimated coefficients. 
Whatever can save several potential sources of error in the 
variables. In addition, performance indicators can be difficult 
to compare and interpret, as well as the explanatory variables 
may not beings truly exogenous to performance. 
The choice of technology may depend on the performance of 
the sector and the regulatory framework, as well, the extent of 
regulatory reforms may be influenced by the performance of 
the sector. 
As has been stated above, it is difficult to define productivity 
in the service sector and a precise measurement of this 
variable. Productivity of telecommunications may be based on 
the number of users served, the number of minutes assured 
communications, the number of bytes transmitted, the range 
and quality of services as well as network externalities 
(generally not measurable). 
 
In addition, the measurement of prices also poses difficult 
problems. For the price of the fixed and mobile telephony, we 
limit ourselves to the weighted average cost of call 3 minutes 
during rush hour and the cost of 3 minute call to call off peak 
hours, lack of availability of data. It will be ideal to take into 
account with this basket of prices, the burden of residential 
telephone connections load connections Business telephony 
and prepaid connection load and post paid mobile. 
Institutional environment for our database is the world wide 
governance indicators (September 2010). This database 
includes six governance indicators mentioned above, each 
indicator is aggregated from individual indicators from several 
sources. Our panel covers 15 countries in the MENA region 
for the period 1990-2009, a period capturing a large number of 
reform initiatives in this area. 
The inputs to the model are derived from several databases 
produced by various international organizations like the World 
Bank and the International Telecommunication Union. 
B - Econometric methodology: 
The configuration of our data suggests an approach for doing 
econometrics of panel data. 
The method differentiated GMM (DIFGMM) applied to time 
series-cross (TSCS). Tests and Lagrange multiply the Wald 
test applied to the data providing the presence of fixed and 
dynamic effects, this method has been suggested by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) to analyze panel data and has been applied 
by Beck and Katz (2004 ) data TSCS. 
Certainly, the GMM estimator in dynamic panel is based on 
two variants: the first is the first-difference GMM estimator of 
Arellano and Bond (1991) is taken into account for each 
period the first difference of equation estimate to eliminate the 
effects of specific countries, and then instrumenting the 
explanatory variables in first difference equation by their 
values at a delayed period or more. 
The second is the system GMM estimator Blundel and Bond 
(1998) which combines the first-difference equations with the 
TABLE I 
INTRODUCING VARIABLES 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
Rate 
 
  
p-mbl 
 
Rate of mobile 
 p-fix Rate of fixed telephony 
Productivity  l-emp 
 
main lines per employee (number of 
mainlines / total employment) 
 
 (MITT)/ET Outgoing minutes of international calls 
(MITT)  
 NAM/EM  
Number of subscribers to mobile / Jobs 
Mobile 
 
Quality  DER/100L  
Faults per 100 main lines per year 
 
 LA/LF waiting list for fixed line main 
 
 
Institutional Quality  
 
xit 
 
 GE The effectiveness of public action 
PS political stability 
Crpt Control of Corruption 
RL quality legal procedures 
RQ  The regulatory quality 
VA 
 
Capabilities and claim-term "Voice and 
Accountability" 
 
Reform 
 
M s 
 
Priv Privatization of the incumbent (dummy) 
 
IO 
 
indicator opening telecommunications 
markets 
 
 
Z s 
 
Indicators relating to technology 
and economic structure (exogenous 
economic characteristics). 
 
Taille -pop Population size 
 
INVF /ET Total fixed investment in the telecom / 
total employment (technology - capital 
intensive) 
 
RT/POP Total revenue Telecommunications / 
population (economic structure, income) 
 
PIB/Habitant                               
                           
 
 
  
level equations in which the variables are instrumented by their 
first differences. The second estimator is more efficient than 
the first because it gives biased results in finite samples when 
the instruments are weak. 
Indeed, Arellano and Bond (1991) extend the approach of 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982) using the Generalized 
Method of Moments in order to exploit all the orthogonality 
relations between the lagged endogenous variable and the term 
error, which leads to a proliferation of instruments. A typical 
relationship is specified as a dynamic equation given by: 
log(yit) = α0+ α1log(yit−1) + x’it β  + μi +εit  (1) 
where i = 1, 2,. . . , N, t = 1, 2,. . . , T, Yit is the dependent 
variable representing dimensional economic performance of 
the sector, 0 and 1 are scalar parameters, Xit is a vector of 
explanatory variables, the vector of regressors representing the 
quality of the macro-institutional, β is the vector of parameters 
associated with régreseurs, μi parameter representing the 
country specific effect, εit is an error term.  
The subscripts i and t denote the country and year. 
Standard assumptions are made as follows; 
 
E(μi) = 0, E(εit) = 0, E(εit μi) = 0, E(yi1 εit) = 0  (2) 
Moreover, the estimate can be potentially suffered endogeinité 
from a correlation of two types: a correlation between the 
regressors and fixed-term effect on the one hand, and the 
correlation between the regressors and the term error, on the 
other hand. 
In addition, the explanatory variables used to capture the 
degree of privatization and liberalization are likely to be 
endogenous, especially in the early stages of reform. Certainly, 
taking as an example the licenses are granted conditionally 
upon the achievement of certain performance based on 
penetration, quality or other aspects of the industry. 
 
The problem of endogeneity resulting from the correlation of 
the first type is circumvented by the simple expression of 
equation (1) in first differences: 
∆log(yit) = α1∆ log(yit−1) + ∆x’it β + ∆εit    (3) 
Δ is the first difference operator. However, this transformation 
brings with it another endogeneity problem due to the 
contemporaneous correlation between 
  Log (yit-1) and the error term εit-1. The question is to find 
tools that can be used in the estimation of equation (3). 
Unlike the GMM dynamic, standard econometric techniques 
such as OLS does not provide efficient estimates of such a 
model, because of the presence of the explanatory variable 
delayed. 
 
III- Results and interpretations: 
The purpose of this section is twofold. Firstly, we try to find 
some general properties of the data from a review of its static 
descriptive. Second, we discuss the analysis of the correlation 
matrix and the results of our estimation for the coefficients of 
variables reform and institutional environment variables. 
A-Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables in our model has a dispersion of variability 
(Appendix 2). Certainly, the rate variable mobile phone has an 
average of 0.227 and a low variability of 0, 35 (standard 
deviation), the variable rate fixed telephony has an average of 
0.44 and a variability of 0.41. 
 
Variables measuring productivity, citing the main lines per 
employee, Minutes of outgoing international calls, number of 
mobile subscribers has an average and variability. The first 
and second respectively has an average of 4.9 and 9.6, and 
high variability of 1.02 and 1.16. 
For variables representing the quality of service, recording a 
best result variable Faults per 100 main lines per year, has an 
average of 2.9 and a high variability (1.36). The waiting list 
for fixed line main has an average of 10.9 and a high 
variability (2,1). 
Variables reforms present different variability in the effect 
variable privatization has an average of 0.29 and a low 
variability of 0.45. While the opening of the sector indicator 
has an average of 3.9 and a high variability of 2.07. 
Nevertheless, the macro variables have a strong institutional 
variability.  
The variable quality of Legal procedures (RL) has an average 
of 51, 32 and a high variability 19, 98. The political stability 
variable has a mean of 37 and a high variability of 22. 
The variable measuring control of corruption has an average of 
50 and a high variability of 22. The regulatory quality has an 
average of 47.7 and a high variability 21, 56. The effectiveness 
of public action has an average of 50 and a high variability of 
21. 
 
Immediate demands and capacities of expression has an 
average of 24 and a high variability of 15. 
 
In addition, the size of the population considered as a control 
variable has an average of 15.76 and a high variability of 1.34. 
 
The total investment in fixed telecom in relation to total 
employment, which reflects the capital intensive technological 
effort and has an average of 9.14 and a high variability of 1.7. 
Telecommunications revenue variable that reflects the 
economic structure has an average of 4.15 and a high 
variability of 1.66. The level of wealth (GDP per capita) has 
an average of 8.3 and a variability of 1.22. 
Analysis the correlation matrix shows the existence of 
problems multicolineraité between variables. According to 
Appendix 2, we see that the correlation between the variables 
reform and institutional macro environment is strongly 
influenced by a correlation between openness indicator (IO) 
sector and the Control of Corruption (CC) (0.06) thus 
validating the hypothesis that countries with a high level 
corruption discourages privatization (Auriol and Picard 
(2004)), and a strong correlation between openness indicator 
and quality of legal procedures (RL) (0.08). 
 
In addition, there was a strong negative correlation between 
privatization and immediate demands and capabilities of 
expression (VA) (-0.0295), in fact, political and individual 
rights enjoyed by citizens discourage privatization. 
  
B- correlation matrix 
The analysis by the correlation matrix shows the existence of 
multi collinearity problems between variables Recipe Total 
telecommunications and level of wealth (GDP per capita), 
quality procedures between information (RL), control of 
corruption (CC) , the regulatory quality (RQ) and the 
effectiveness of public action (GE) between regulatory quality 
(RQ) and the effectiveness of public action (GE) and finally 
between GE and capabilities immediate demands and 
expression (VA). The problem of multi collinearity can 
conclude that we can not use all variables together in our 
model, where we'll settle for the institutional environment 
variables to take into consideration only the quality of process 
of law (RL), political stability and immediate demands and 
capabilities of expression (VA). 
On variables related to technology and economic structure, it 
is limited to the size of the population, total revenue of the 
sector and the density of capital (total investment in the 
sector). 
C- Method (SSGMM) 
We find that the price of the mobile phone is significantly and 
positively affected by the rate of mobile telephony in the 
previous year and negatively by the macro-institutional 
capabilities detected by immediate demands and expression 
(VA). Immediate demands a capacity of 10% leads to a small 
decrease in price of mobile price by 0.01%. 
 
While the rate of fixed telephony is significantly and positively 
affected by the price of fixed telephony in the previous period 
at 1%, and significantly and negatively affected by the size of 
the population at 10%. Indeed, an increase in the population 
size of 10% resulting in a population density causing a 
significant decrease in the price of mobile tariff of 1.07%, 
explained by a large economy of scale. 
With regard to institutional quality, it is noted that the quality 
of legal procedures significantly and positively affects the 
price of a fixed rate. 
 
The results of the first and second regression let us design the 
reform component detected by the indicator of openness and 
privatization of the incumbent has no significant effect on the 
performance of the sector where the performance is measured 
by the rate of the fixed or mobile. 
However, the reform component has a significant enough 
weight on the sector's performance measured by labor 
productivity, certainly a policy of liberalization of the sector 
produces an improvement in productivity, this is particularly 
the case where the performance is measured by the Minutes 
outgoing international calls (MITT) in relation to the total 
employment, where privatization and openness indicator has a 
significant and positive effect on this measure. 
The privatization of the historic operator causes an increase in 
outgoing minutes of international calls. Certainly, a change in 
the allocation of property causes a different structure for 
encouraging management thus inducing a change in 
managerial behavior and performance of the company. 
 
The change in allocative efficiency is due largely to changes in 
the ownership structure of firms and to a lesser extent to the 
market structure revealed by the openness indicator for the 
MENA area. 
In addition, the increased competition increases the pressure 
on firms to adopt better technology eliminates the 
underutilization of resources and improves organizational 
performance in terms of productivity. 
 
Procedures liberalization has a negative and statistically 
significant main lines per employee and the number of mobile 
subscribers. 
 
Certainly, the establishment of an independent regulatory 
authority, the average degree of competition in different 
segments of the network of fixed and mobile telephony and 
openness to foreign direct investment in the fixed and mobile 
networks have a negative impact on performance sector 
measured by mainlines per employee and the number of 
mobile subscribers. 
From our results, we conclude that institutional quality has a 
marginal effect on the performance of the sector where reforms 
adopted revealed by the degree of openness, the degree of 
competition and privatization have a significant and negative 
sector performance. 
 
This negative effect of the liberalization of the sector is 
explained by the Premature liberalization in the MENA region, 
the institutional effort has no impact on the performance of the 
sector in an area where the network is in a growth phase. 
We get results "unexpected" among the political variables 
(privatization and opening). Certainly, the effects of regulation 
and competition in local services are negative in our model. 
They nevertheless theoretical and empirical models exist 
specific market and / or regulator failure when barriers to entry 
increases welfare (Laffont, 1999). 
It is also possible to think that competition in local services 
leads to inefficient duplication of networks in growth areas. 
Institutional quality as measured by immediate demands and 
capabilities of expression (VA) has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on labor productivity measured by Minutes 
outgoing international calls (MITT) reported the total 
employment and the number of mobile subscribers / Jobs 
Mobile. An improvement of 10% VA leads to an increase in 
the number of outgoing minutes of international calls (MITT) 
reported the total employment by 0.15% and an increase of 54, 
6% of the number of mobile subscribers reported in 
Employment mobile. In addition, we can see that institutional 
quality to a marginal effect on the sector's performance, when 
it is measured by labor productivity. 
With regard to the first register of the economic performance 
of the sector to know the quality of telecommunications 
services, institutional quality has a serious effect on the first 
step. Certainly, a 10% improvement in the quality of process 
of law (RL) causes a reduction of 0.19% of the number of 
faults per 100 main lines per year and a decrease of 0.28% of 
the waiting list for main fixed line. 
Moreover, in the same context registry is taken as an 
improvement in the macro-institutional detected by political 
  
stability leads to an increase in waiting list for fixed line main 
0.49%, which is explained by the slow administrative 
procedures. 
Regarding the reform component, we find that neither the open 
market or the privatization of historic operator has no 
significant effect on the number of faults per 100 main lines 
per year, whereas the effort of openness has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on the waiting list for fixed line 
main. 
Historic privatization of operators leads to a decrease of the 
waiting list for a fixed line for main area studied. Certainly, the 
opening of the sector to the outside and privatization increases 
competition and improves the quality of service. 
In addition, the density measured by the total capital 
investment in fixed telecoms reported total employment has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the quality of 
service as measured by the number of faults per 100 main lines 
per year, a 10% increase of total fixed investment in Telecom 
leads to an increase of 0.39% of the fault. This result can be 
explained by the made a major investment effort in the area 
causes an increase in fixed teledensity thus explaining the 
increase in the number of faults, or an investment effort must 
be accompanied by a major effort to reform (liberalization and 
openness) had a significant effect on the quality of service and 
network, to act positively on the economic performance of the 
sector. 
This result is also confirmed by the third regression. Indeed, 
increased effort investment in the sector has a significant and 
positive effect on the number of main lines per employee 
(number of mainlines / total employment) accompanied by a 
significant effect of policy reform on this measure 
productivity. 
In addition, technological effort detected by the density of 
capital must be accompanied by policy reforms to strengthen 
the sector's performance. 
The income effect has a significant impact on the performance 
of the sector. A 10% increase in income sector as measured by 
total revenue Telecommunications relative to the size of the 
population leads to an increase of 0, 79% of main lines per 
employee, an increase of 21.5% of subscribers the mobile / 
Jobs Mobile. 
In addition, an increase in the population size of 10% leads to 
a decrease of 3.28% inconvenience, this can be explained by 
the importance of scale economy triggered by the increase in 
consumers of fixed and mobile . 
One lesson that emerges from the description of the 
institutional environment is that most countries in the region 
have opted for a "controlled competition". Although the 
traditional monopoly becomes rare, most governments are 
reluctant to give up discretionary policy and delegate 
completely the choice markets. 
A major challenge seems to be largely acquired: in many 
cases, privatization has been accompanied by the introduction 
of some measures of competition. But governments have been 
reluctant to allow free entry, and in many cases, the private 
and foreign participation has been limited in the capital of the 
incumbent. 
Many governments also had difficulties to give credibility to 
their reform programs and weakness regulators "independent" 
or supposed to be. This is what increases the attractiveness of 
the GATS as a means to continue reforms and give them more 
credibility. 
The objective of this review is to evaluate the hypothesis that 
the commitments in the GATS telecommunications have 
brought benefits to the countries of the MENA region who 
have made commitments in the sector. The measures used are 
a good representation of the performance of the sector. 
 
Econometric estimators allow an assessment of the relative 
importance of alternative policy reforms and, in some cases, 
their interactions. To capture the interdependence between 
policies, we introduced two interaction terms for privatization 
policies and openness. Privatization in the MENA region 
coincided in many cases with a foreign equity, it would be 
interesting to study the effect of this interaction on the 
economic performance of the sector. 
 
The transfer of capital, technology and know-how seems to 
affect positively the performance of the telecommunications 
sector. 
With our econometric analysis of interaction shows the 
existence of a significant interaction ente privatization and 
opening only the fourth two-stage specification and 
specification for the fifth one step. Indeed simultaneous action 
between the policy of opening coating of competition policy 
and regulation has a significant but negative effect on the 
number of outgoing minutes of international calls (MITT) / 
Total employment (0352) and the number of subscribers the 
mobile / Jobs Mobile (1.09). 
 
When looking at the interaction terms in two dimensions, we 
find that the impact of changes to the policy of privatization 
(opening) is negatively influenced by the implementation of 
the open policy (privatization ). 
This leaves found that adoption of two policies simultaneously 
have a negative impact on the sector's performance is 
measured only by labor productivity. 
Interaction terms also give some unexpected results for other 
specifications (other performance measures). 
 
The negative effect of regulation may be surprising, but it may 
also indicate that the establishment of a separate regulator is a 
necessary but not sufficient for effective regulation. 
 
IV-CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has analyzed the relationship between the political 
sector reform and institutional policy on the 
telecommunications sector performance, taking into account 
the three registers of performance: quality, productivity and 
profitability. From the results, it has been noted that the reform 
component has a significant enough weight on the sector's 
performance measured by labor productivity, certainly a 
political liberalization and privatization policy leads to a 
  
productivity improvement , This is particularly the case where 
the performance is measured by the Minutes outgoing 
international calls (MITT) compared to total employment. 
Moreover, it has been found that the establishment of an 
independent regulatory authority, the average degree of 
competition in different segments of the network of fixed and 
mobile telephony and openness to foreign direct investment in 
the fixed and mobile networks have a negative impact on the 
sector's performance measured by mainlines per employee and 
the number of mobile subscribers, and a positive impact on the 
number of outgoing international minutes. As explained by 
that made this area began a premature liberalization of the 
sector. 
 
The results obtained showed that the change in allocative 
efficiency is due largely to changes in the ownership structure 
of firms and to a lesser extent the structure of the market 
indicator integrated into opening the MENA Zone . 
With our econometric approach, it has been shown that 
political reforms are beings guided by supportive policies like 
a major technological effort and income sector, to improve the 
economic performance of the sector . Certainly, increased 10% 
increased investment in the sector on the one hand, a 
significant and positive effect on the number of main lines per 
employee, while being guided by a significant effect of policy 
reform on the latter measure, detected by an increase of 
0.27%. 
On the other hand, with this investment policy reform has a 
significant and positive effect on the quality of service and 
network, as marked by a decrease of 0.39% of the number of 
faults per 100 lines principal per year. Furthermore, we 
conclude that a policy reform must be accompanied by an 
effort reflecting technological capital density to enhance the 
performance of the sector. 
In addition, institutional quality has a marginal effect on the 
sector's performance is measured by labor productivity. 
With regard to the first register of the economic performance 
of the sector to know the quality of telecommunications 
services, institutional quality has a serious effect on the first 
step. Certainly, a 10% improvement in the quality of process 
of law (RL) has resulted in a decrease of 0.19% in the number 
of faults per 100 main lines per year and a decrease of 0.28% 
of the waiting list for main fixed line. 
Moreover, in the same context registry is taken as an 
improvement in the macro-institutional detected by political 
stability leads to an increase in waiting list for fixed line main 
0.49%, which is explained by the slow administrative 
procedures. 
Privatization in the MENA region coincided in many cases 
with foreign capital participation, so an analysis of the effect 
of this interaction on the economic performance of the sector 
has shown that simultaneous action between the policy of 
opening coating a policy competition and regulation will have 
a significant but negative effect on the number of outgoing 
minutes of international calls (MITT) / total employment 
(0352) and the number of mobile subscribers / Jobs Mobile 
(1.09). The negative impact of the interaction of the two 
policies on economic performance is explained by the 
premature liberalization of the sector in the study area, 
certainly premature liberalization accompanied by 
privatization of incumbents have a negative effect on the 
performance of the sector. 
Moreover, the negative effect of a policy of openness 
including regulatory policy and political attractiveness of FDI 
on sector performance can be surprising, whatever may 
indicate premature liberalization of the sector and can indicate 
that the introduction of a separate controller is a necessary but 
not sufficient for effective control. 
It is therefore preferable to measure the quality of competition 
and regulatory structures as well as their actual independence 
in the econometric models. Now it is difficult to detect these 
measures for our sample, certainly time data on actual 
competition like the market shares of operators are not 
available and the lack of effective independence of regulators. 
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